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The Competing-risk Analysis of post-IPO Delistings 
 
This paper is working on one IPO panel data to estimate the predicting power of 
some covariates on future status of IPO firms after going public. Specifically, our study 
aims to study how the possibility of the delisting due to different reasons, including 
merges, moves between exchanges, and bad performance (liquidation/Bankruptcy), is 
affected by those covariates. The results show that the inclusion of the aftermarket 
performance in a competing risk model helps to distinguish the impact of those covariates 
on the delistings caused by three events. There are three main results from our analysis. 
First, it is found that most of covariates have significant effects on two types of delistings, 
mergers- and failure-originated. On the other side, only firm size and capital structure are 
related to the delisting when the IPO firm switches to another exchange. Second, we find 
that some covariates have significant effects on two delistings, acquisition/merger- or 
liquidation/bankruptcy-originated, in the same direction, including technology dummy, 
IPO activity, firm age, asset growth, R&D expenses, and leverage. Third, three covariates, 
including venture capital dummy, profitability, and firm size, have opposite effect on 
different events triggering the delisting, mergers and bad performance. The increase of 
these covariates could increase the risk of acquisition/merge delisting whereas reduce the 
risk of failure delisting. 
 
1 
The Competing-risk Analysis of post-IPO Delistings 
 
1. Introduction 
Our study is attempting to assess post-IPO delisting due to different reasons based 
on the information provided by IPO deal-related characteristics at the IPO time and 
accounting covariates, which are updated periodically after going public. The assessment 
of delisting possibility is of significant importance for investors who are interested in the 
IPO firms since such assessment can help make the correct decision whether or not to 
adjust their portfolios if related to the new firms.  
We classify all the delistings into three groups according to their reasons, which 
triggered the delistings. The information on all the delisting reasons is provided by the 
CRSP delisting codes. Based on delisting codes, there are four categories of aftermarket 
status of new firms after going public, including “active”, “delisted due to 
acquisition/merge”, “delisted due to moves to different exchanges”, and “delisted due to 
bad performance”. Here, we also refer bad performance as liquidation or bankruptcy.  
It is not uncommon to observe a firm to be delisted after the initial public offering 
(IPO). Since delistings may be triggered by many events, including merger/acquisition, 
migration to another exchange, liquidation, and bankruptcy, these potential reasons for 
delistings are defined as competing risks. These events are competing because the one 
which occurs first causes the delisting of IPO firms, preventing other events from 
happening completely.  For example, a firm can not default if it has already been delisted 
because of an acquisition. Therefore, when we are assessing delisting risk generated by a 
specific event of interest, it is necessary to control for the effect of other competing-risk 
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events simultaneously because of the interdependence among the possibilities of multiple 
cause-specific delistings. 
The current IPO literature has focused the most attention on predicting the future 
states of firms after the IPO, using the data available before the IPO or at the IPO date. 
Several papers find that a set of variables, such as firm size and age, can be used to 
forecast whether the IPO firm survives or delists.  There exists little or no evidence 
examining the competing reasons for IPO delisting. Also, the use of post-IPO financial 
data has not received much attention in examining the specific delisting reasons.  We 
suggest that the post-IPO multi-period financial data might be helpful in explaining the 
competing rationale for delisting.  
The most widely used method to deal with competing-risk dataset, proposed by 
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980), is to estimate model separately for each type of failure 
while treating the different events as censored data. However, Lunn and McNeil (1995) 
argue that one drawback of the Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) method is that it doesn’t 
treat the different risks jointly. Therefore, in this paper, we implement the method 
proposed by Fine and Gray (1990) to fit a competing risk model to a panel data of initial 
public offerings consisting of 4,546 IPOs from 1975 through 2006. 
By taking in competing-risk events account to describe the effect of covariates on 
post-IPO delistings due to the three reasons, our study contributes to the current literature 
on IPO failure risk in two aspects. First, we apply the competing-risk model to the IPO 
panel data, which including both IPO-deal related properties at the IPO date and annually 
updated accounting information after going public. To our understanding, such analysis 
has yet been done. The competing risk analysis on the IPO panel data is able to help 
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predicting the possibility of delisting due to different reason more precisely, in terms of 
both the algorithm of duration model and the amount of information. 
Second, the reasons for post-IPO delistings are classified into three main groups 
according the delisting codes, including acquisition/merger, move to another exchanges, 
and liquidation/bankruptcy. Since the prior literature always divided the delisting events 
to two groups by combining takeover with move between exchanges, some information 
may have been missed. Differently speaking, it is possible for investors to retrieve 
different information out of two different events, acquisition/merger and move to another 
exchange. Therefore, a more detailed classification of competing-risk events can improve 
our understanding about how post-IPO delistings are determined. 
The results show that, by including the aftermarket annual accounting information, 
competing risk model can help distinguish the impact of those covariates on the delistings 
due to three different reasons. There are three main results out of our analysis. First, it is 
found that most of covariates have significant effects on delistings due to both 
acquisition/merger and liquidation/bankruptcy, whereas only two factors, firm size and 
capital structure, are related to the delisting triggered by the switches of IPO firm from 
one exchange to another. Second, we find that some covariates have significant effects on 
two delistings, acquisition/merger- or liquidation/bankruptcy-originated, in the same 
direction, including technology dummy, IPO activity, firm age, asset growth, R&D 
expenses, and leverage. Third, three covariates, including venture capital dummy, 
profitability, and firm size, have opposite effect on different events triggering the 
delisting, acquisition/merger and liquidation/bankruptcy. The increase of these covariates 
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could increase the possibility of delisting generated by acquisition/merge but reduce the 
risk of delisting due to failure, either liquidation or bankruptcy. 
 
2. Literature review  
The delisting risk, also called as failure risk, has been a hot topic under studies so 
far. Many researchers suggest that some information available before the issuance or at 
the IPO date is related to the future state of the firm after going public. For example, 
Hensler, Rutherford, and Springer (1997) find that the survival time for IPOs increases 
with some firm properties, including firm size, age of the firm at the offering, the initial 
return, IPO activity level in the market, and the percentage of insider ownership.  Their 
results of duration models also show that survival is negatively related to other factors 
such as the number of risk characteristics.  
Fama and French (2004) investigate the characteristics of new firms listed on 
major U.S. stock markets from 1973 to 2001 and find that both declining profitability and 
increasing growth lead to more IPO firms delisted due to bankruptcy, but have no impact 
on the possibility of IPO firm delisted due to acquisition/merge. Therefore, their results 
imply that both profitability and growth could be good candidates to distinguish between 
the survival and failure of IPO firms. 
Howton (2006) studies the relationship between firm’s governance characteristics 
and the post-IPO state. His results show that IPO firms that are venture-backed, have a 
CEO who is the original firm founder, have an outside block holder present, use a more 
reputable underwriter, and have a more stable board directors are more likely to survive 
than be acquired in the first five years after the IPO whereas a larger percentage of grey 
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directors on the board are associated with IPO firms that are more likely to fail. His 
analysis is performed by fitting one Logistic regression between each pair of three future 
states after going public, consisting of “survive”, “delisted due to takeover”, and “delisted 
due to failure”. 
Demers and Joos (2007) study the survival rate of IPO firms by including IPO-
deal characteristics and accounting information at the IPO time. The information that they 
used to predict the survival rate of IPOs is available around the issuing date. Moreover, 
they find that the possibility of IPO failure estimated by logit model is negatively 
associated with one-year post-IPO abnormal returns. In other words, the information on 
IPO failure is not complete at the IPO date, implying that more post-IPO information is 
necessary for a more precise estimate of IPO failure. 
However, very few studies among the IPO literatures has attempted to assess the 
delisting risk by using the post-IPO accounting information over multiple periods after 
going public in the duration models. Therefore, it is of interest to examine whether or not 
including the aftermarket accounting numbers improves the predictability of duration 
models on the future status after going public. 
 
3. Determinants and Methodology 
3.1 Determinants of IPO delistings 
In this study we examine how the likelihood of post-IPO delistings due to three 
different reasons is determined. Following the current prior IPO literature, we consider 
two sets of covariates as potential determinants: fixed and time-varying. For example, 
Demers and Joos (2007) include IPO-deal characteristics as fixed determinants, 
6 
 
composed of technology dummy, venture-backed dummy, under-pricing, IPO proceeds, 
and number of IPO per quarter. These covariates are defined as fixed since their values 
will remain unchanged once the issue has been finished at the IPO time. They also 
include the accounting determinants in their models to predict the IPO failure risk. 
However, they only estimate their models based on the accounting information over 
single-period around the issuing time. In other words, the information contained by 
annual financial statements after going public has not been taken into account in their 
study. 
Unlike Demers and Joos (2007), we are attempting to check the link between the 
delisting possibility and the determinants by adding the post-IPO financial accounting 
information, which are updated annually after going public, as time-varying determinants. 
This group includes firm age, firm size, profitability, growth, research and development 
expenses, selling, general, and administrative expenses, and leverage. 
Many studies have shown that venture capital firms improve the aftermarket 
performance of IPO firms. For example, both Jain and Kini (2000) and Brav and 
Gompers (1997) argue that VC backed IPOs outperform non-VC backed firms, although 
the conclusion of the latter only holds when returns are weighted equally. Thus, we 
expect that VC-backed IPO firms are less likely to be delisted due to bad performance, 
either liquidation or bankruptcy, than non-VC backed IPO firms.  
Howton (2006) finds that a venture-backed IPO firm is more likely to survive 
rather than delisting after a takeover, which can be explained by the post-IPO presence of 
the venture firm on the board, proposed by Brav and Gompers (1997). However, we 
should treat this statement with more caution since Howton (2006) doesn’t take into 
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account the existence of competing-risk event in his study. As we know, the incidence of 
competing-risk event depends on each other. In sum, it is hard to predict the effect of 
venture capital firms on the post-IPO delisting due to acquisition or merger. 
The literature has shown that probability of post-IPO delisting, caused by either 
takeover or bad performance, will be affected by the fact whether the IPO firm belongs to 
technology or internet industries. For example, Howton (2006) argues that the IPO firm 
in a high technology industry is more likely to be acquired, but less likely to be failed 
when comparing to survive within the first five years after going public. We expect that 
an IPO firm in internet industry has a higher possibility to be delisted due to takeover but 
a lower one for the delisting due to bad performance.  
The current literature has proposed two theories in order to interpret the issue of 
IPO underpricing. The first theory attributes the underpricing to investor’s uncertainty 
while the second argue that the managers are using underpricing to signal the firm quality. 
In case of uncertainty theory, a positive coefficient estimate is expected for underpricing 
in the event of bad performance. If the signaling model holds, we may expect a negative 
estimate for underpricing since an IPO firm with good quality is more likely to survive 
than delisted, no matter how the delisting is triggered. 
 As proposed by Fama and French (2004), we expect that profitability should help 
reduce the risk of delisting triggered by bad performance, either liquidation or bankruptcy. 
Meanwhile, their study implies a positive association between growth of assets and 
failure rate. However, they argue that there is no significant of either variable on the 
delisting risk originated from acquisition/merges. 
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 Firm size has been proven to be a key issue when the firms are making decision 
on takeover or other issues. The prior literature has documented that a larger firm is more 
likely to survive because of a less default risk. 
Following Demers and Joos (2007), we include R&D expenses to capture the 
scale of firm’s expenditures on R&D. The effect of R&D expenses on delisting risk could 
be either positive or negative. On one side, more R&D expenses may provide more 
growth opportunity for the IPO firm, indicating a negative link between R&D expenses 
and the delisting risk, i.e. R&D expenses will reduce the possibility of IPO firms to be 
delisted after going public. On the other side, a higher level of R&D expenses could 
imply the management inefficiency of the assets-in-place. Therefore, it is hard to predict 
the direction how R&D expenses will affect the delisting risk due to different reasons. 
 The same story applies to another variable, selling, general, and administrative 
(SG&A) expenses with the exception that SG&A expenses are related to intangible assets. 
Again, the firm may benefit from more SG&A expenses if the investment on intangible 
assets can create real future growth opportunity. Otherwise, a higher SG&A expenses 
may do harm to firm’s performance, leading a higher possibility of being delisted.     
It has been documented that leverage plays an important role in predicting either 
the post-IPO status of new firm or the default risk of seasoned firm. Consistent with the 
findings in the prior studies, we expect a positive effect of leverage on the probability of 
delisting since a higher leverage would increase default risk, leading to more delistings. 
Put all together, we include two sets of determinants in our competing-risk models, 
IPO deal-related characteristics, which are fixed at the IPO time, and aftermarket 
accounting variables, which are updated periodically. Therefore, there are multiple 
9 
 
observations for each sample firm with time-varying accounting variables but fixed IPO 
deal-related properties.  
  
3.2 Methodology 
The most widely used method to deal with competing-risk dataset, proposed by 
Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980), is to estimate model separately for each type of failure 
while treating the different events as censored data. However, Lunn and McNeil (1995) 
argue that one drawback of the Kalbfleisch and Prentice (1980) method is that it doesn’t 
treat the different risks jointly. Instead, they suggest that a data duplication method can 
avoid such disadvantage. For example, all the observations of their cancer datasets are 
counted twice in the final sample to estimate the model, one for each type of failure risk.  
Based on the method proposed by Fine and Gray (1999), we model the delisting 
rate due to reason j as subhazard defined as  
)exp()()|( 0, jjj XthXth β=  
where j =1, 2, and 3 for the acquisition/merger, the moves to another exchanges, and the 
bad performance, respectively. X represents a set of variables, including fixed and time 
varying covariates. βj denotes the effect of covariates on the subhazard function caused 
by the  j
th
 reason. hj(t) is the instantaneous probability that a new list is delisted for reason 
j conditional on that it is delisted first time since its listing. In the following analysis, the 
competing risk models are estimated using the Stcrreg package in STATA, which 
implements the method proposed by Fine and Gray (1999). 
We also divide the full sample to subsamples based on firm size, measured by 
total assets (Equity) in this paper, and then, graph the Cumulative Incidence Function 
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(CIF) of each competing-risk events for each firm-size groups. The firm with total assets 
lying below 70th percentile is defined as small firm while the firm with total assets lying 
above 30th percentile as large firm. The firm lying between 30th and 70th percentiles is 
classified as medium firms. The CIFs are computed based on the coefficient estimates 
from the competing-risk models for each cause-specific delisting, and the means of each 
variable within each firm size subgroup. By doing so, we can see how firm size affects 
the delisting risk due to different reasons for those typical firms of each firm size groups. 
Table-1 defines all the variables used in this paper. The variables include the IPO 
deal-related characteristics, which are fixed at the IPO date once the issue has been 
finished, and the post-IPO financial data, which are time-varying. 
[Table-1 about here] 
 
4. Data 
Our data collection originates from 8,464 IPOs from Jay Ritter’s IPO data base 
from 1975 through 2006, containing founding date and first trading date for each firm. 
The information on the date of the issue, the dollar value of proceeds raised, and the 
percentage change in the stock price on the first trading day (under-pricing) are collected 
from Securities Data Company (SDC)’s Database. Following Fama and French (2003), 
our sample excludes REITs, closed-end funds, ADRs, unit offers, MLPs, and all issues 
with an offer price below 5 dollars. The SDC dataset covers the new issue in the United 
States from 1985 to 2008. We obtain the annual financial data for these IPO firms from 
the CRSP and COMPUSTAT database.  
11 
 
To be included in the final sample, the firms must have unique 6-digital CUSIP 
identification across JayRitter/SDC/CRSP/COMPUSTAT datasets to ensure the data 
availability of all the data required for our analysis. There are about 80% matches 
between CRSP and COMPUSTAT among the initial list of 8,464 IPO firms from Jay 
Ritter. Then, about 2,200 firms are deleted due to the mismatches between SDC and 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT and 4,546 firms remain in our final sample for survival analysis. 
The aftermarket status of IPO firms is classified by their CRSP delisting codes. 
The firms are identified as “active” if their delisting codes are 100, “delisted due to 
acquisition/merge” if their delisting codes are in the 200 range, “delisted due to move to 
another exchanges” if their delisting codes are in the 300 range. The 200’s indicate 
“acquired in merger” and the 300’s indicate “issues acquired by exchange of stock”.  The 
firms are classified as “delisted due to bad performance” if their delisting codes are in the 
400 range or 500 range, which we refer the bad performance as liquidation or bankruptcy. 
However, 55 firms whose delisting codes are from 501 to 520 and one with 575 are 
dropped from the final samples. Table-2 shows the status of all the remaining 4,547 IPO 
firms in the final sample. 
[Table-2 about here] 
There are 3,139 delistings among 4,547 IPO firms from 1975 to 2006, including 
2,020 acquisition/merge delistings, 42 moves between exchanges delistings and 1,077 
failure delistings. Consistent with Fama and French (2004), the number of IPO firms on 
major U.S. stock markets increases from the1970s to the post-1980 periods in general. 
Table-3 summarizes the data. 
[Table-3 about here] 
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 Following Demers and Joos (2007), we adjust the value for those variables, which 
are measured in dollar amount, back to the value in 1973 dollar values according to the 
annual CPI growth rate, in order to get rid of the effect of inflation rate on our results. 
Such adjustment makes our results more comparable to the current IPO literature. The 
descriptive statistics of variable in our study is consistent with the previous studies such 
as Fama and French (2004) and Demers and Joos (2007).  
The IPO firms have an average survival time of 66.11 months and underpricing of 
5.35%. It is interesting to find that the IPO firms are making 2.12% profit (measured by 
E/A) on average, with the exception of those bad performance delisted IPO firms, which 
are suffering a loss of -4.43%. 
 
5. Empirical results 
 5.1 Competing-risk model using the data within 5 years after IPO time  
Table-4 shows the results for the competing-risk model, using the IPO deal-
related characteristics and annually financial accounting data within 5 years after going 
public. The results are reported in Table-4.  
[Table-4 about here] 
It is worth noting that how each covariate affects the likelihood of post-IPO 
delisting depends on which event triggers the delisting status. Some variables have same 
impacts on three competing risk events in terms of the sign of coefficient estimates, 
whereas the others affect different events in different directions. There are three main 
findings based on the competing-risk analysis. 
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First, we find that most of the coefficient estimates in the event of moves to 
another exchange are insignificant with two exceptions, equity and leverage. In other 
words, firm size and capital structure are positively related to the delisting risk due to 
shift of trading platform, implying that only equity and leverage can help predict the 
possibility of being delisted due to moves between exchanges. Differently speaking, a 
larger firm with more debt is more likely to switch between different trading platforms. 
However, the conclusion should be regard with more cautions since only 43 out of 4,547 
IPO firms were delisted due to change of trading markets. It is recognized that more 
observations be necessary for a deeper understanding of the scenario.   
Second, we find that some covariates have significant effects on two competing-
risk events (acquisition/merger and liquidation/bankruptcy) in the same direction, 
including technology dummy, IPO activity, firm age, asset growth, R&D expenses, and 
leverage.  
Technology dummy has positive coefficients under both events, showing that an 
IPO firm in internet industry has a higher probability of post-IPO delisting, caused by 
either takeover or bad performance. However, our result differs from the current IPO 
studies such as Howton (2006), who finds that the IPO firm in a high technology industry 
is more likely to be acquired, but less likely to be failed when comparing to survive 
within the first five years after going public. The divergence may be attributed to the 
different ways how to treat the competing-risk events. Howton (2006) studies the 
competing-risk events by estimating the pair-wise Logistic regression, which may ignore 
the interdependence among competing-risk events. 
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We also find that IPO activity is positively related to the likelihood of post-IPO 
delistings due to either reason. It is consistent with other studies such as Ritter (1990), 
who argues that the firms are attempting to raise capital when cost of equity is relatively 
low during the hot time. However, Hensler, Rutherford, and Springer (1997) find no 
evidence to support the timing effect on the delisting risk in their study. 
Our results show that the coefficient estimates of firm age are negative for both 
reasons, implying that probability of delisting is inversely related to firm age. This 
conclusion is the same as those proposed by the prior literature, for example Schultz 
(1983) and Hensler, Rutherford, and Springer (1997). Specifically, the older firms are 
more likely to survive than delisting. 
Table-4 also gives a positive coefficient estimate for the asset growth (dA/A), 
confirming the findings in Farm and French (2004). In other words, the new firms are 
more likely to be failed because of a high growth rate of total assets, which may be 
explained by overinvestment. 
It is found that R&D expenses will increase the possibility of delisting due to 
either event based on our analysis. The positive link between R&D expenses and 
delisting risk supports theory of the management inefficiency of the assets-in-place. It 
contraries to the findings in Demers and Joos (2007), who argue that a higher R&D 
expenses means a higher growth opportunity for the IPO firm, indicating a negative link 
between R&D expenses and the delisting risk. 
Consistent with the prior studies, we find a positive effect of leverage on the 
probability of delisting since a higher leverage would increase default risk, leading to 
more delistings.   
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Third, three factors, including venture capital dummy, profitability, and firm size, 
have opposite effect on different events triggering the delisting, acquisition/merger and 
liquidation/bankruptcy. Specifically, the increase of these covariates could increase the 
risk of acquisition/merge delisting whereas reduce the risk of failure delisting.  
For example, the coefficient estimate for the venture capital dummy is 0.27 in 
case of mergers related delisting risk with a -0.32 for delisting due to bad performance, 
either liquidation or bankruptcy. Thus, it can be concluded that a venture capital backed 
firm is more likely to delisted due to mergers rather than survive while less likely to be 
delisted due to bad performance.  
However, our result is against the findings by Howton (2006), who finds that a 
venture-backed IPO firm is more likely to survive rather than delisting after a takeover. 
He attributes his findings to the argument, proposed by Brav and Gompers (1997), that 
the post-IPO presence of the venture firm on the board will reduce the delisting risk 
generated by a takeover. Our results prefer the opposite direction. 
The same pattern is also found for profitability, indicating that a higher firm value 
will increase the possibility of IPO firms to be delisted caused by mergers, while reduce 
the risk of delisting resulting from a bad performance. Our result is consistent with that in 
Fama and French (2004), showing that profitability should help reduce the risk of 
delisting triggered by bad performance, either liquidation or bankruptcy. Meanwhile, 
their study implies a positive association between growth of assets and failure rate. 
However, they argue that there is no significant of either variable on the delisting risk 
originated from acquisition/merges. 
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Firm size has been documented as a key issue when the firms are making decision 
on takeover or other issues. A larger firm is more likely to survive than delisted due to 
liquidation or bankruptcy because of a less default risk, which is supported our result. On 
the other side, we find that a larger firm is more likely to be involved in a takeover event. 
Moreover, we find that some covariates only have effect on one event but not the 
other one, including underpricing, issuing proceeds, and SG&A expenses. For example, 
underpricing has a positive coefficient estimate in case of takeover-originated delisting 
with an insignificant one for failure-triggered delisting. As we mentioned above, two 
theories have been suggested by the current literature to explain IPO underpricing, 
investor’s uncertainty and signal of firm quality. The uncertainty one predicts a positive 
relationship between underpricing and delisting risk while the latter expects a negative 
link, no matter which reason triggered the delisting after going public. Our results support 
the theory of information asymmetry between firm and investors partially instead of 
signaling model.  
 The issuing proceeds has significantly negative coefficient estimate for bad 
performance case with an insignificant one for takeover case, implying that more issuing 
proceeds lead to a lower failure rate. The negative effect could be attributed the fact that 
more cash can protect the new firms from default risk.  
On the other side, another variable, selling, general, and administrative (SG&A) 
expenses is significantly positively related to bad performance triggered delisting without 
any impact on takeover triggered delisting. Since SG&A expenses are related to 
intangible assets, a higher SG&A expenses may do harm to an IPO firm’s aftermarket 
performance, leading a higher possibility of being delisted. 
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Put all together, we can find that factors have different impact on the delisting due 
to three different reasons. Therefore, it is very essential and helpful to consider 
competing-risk events help predict the future states of new firms after going public.      
 
 5.2 Cumulative Incidence Function 
Figure-1 shows the results to compare the Cumulative Incidence Functions (CIF) 
between small, medium, and large firms in case of each competing risk event. The most 
advantage of this method is that the possibility of two delisting-triggering events can be 
compared directly across the post-IPO time period. An IPO firm is classified a small firm 
if the value of its total assets lies below the 70th percentile while a large firm if the value 
of its total assets lies above the 30th percentile. We use the mean values of the variables to 
graph the CIFs in each competing risk events in Figure-1.  
[Figure-1 about here] 
The pictures are showing the effect of firm size on the delisting risk due to various 
competing risk events. The upper panel of Figure-1 shows the CIF curves for different 
firm size groups in terms of delisting risk due to acquisition/merge. It can be seen that a 
typical large firm has a high cumulative possibility of being delisted due to takeover 
events than both medium and small firm. The small firm has the least possibility of being 
delisted because of takeover event. 
The middle panel of Figure-1 shows the CIF curves of delisting risk due to moves 
between exchanges for three firm size groups. Again, we can see that a typical large firm 
has a highest cumulative possibility of being delisted due to shift between exchanges 
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where a small firm has the least one. It should be noted that such delisting risk for both 
medium and small firms is very close to zero, compared to large firms. 
The below panel of Figure-1 shows the CIF curves for different firm size groups 
in terms of delisting risk due to liquidation/bankruptcy. Differently from the above 
reasons, it can be seen that a typical small firm has a highest cumulative possibility of 
being delisted due to bad performance where a large firm has the least possibility of being 
delisted because of bad performance. Similar to the middle panel, we can find that that 
such delisting risk for both medium and large firms is very close to zero, compared to 
small firms. 
In general, the picture of CIFs for individual competing-risk event shows how the 
firm size is affecting delisting risk because of three different reasons in a different way. 
Thus, our analysis may provide helpful instruction when the investors are making 
decision whether or not to invest their money in the IPO firms based on the public 
information available. 
 
6. Conclusion 
One IPO panel data is investigated to estimate the predicting power of some 
covariates on future status of IPO firms after going public. Specifically, our study aims to 
study how the possibility of the delisting due to different reasons, including merges, 
moves between exchanges, and bad performance (liquidation/Bankruptcy), is affected by 
those covariates. The results show that the inclusion of the aftermarket performance in a 
competing risk model helps to distinguish the impact of those covariates on the delistings 
caused by three events.  
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There are three main results from our analysis. First, it is found that most of 
covariates have significant effects on two types of delistings, mergers- and failure-
originated. On the other side, only firm size and capital structure are related to the 
delisting when the IPO firm switches to another exchange. Second, we find that some 
covariates have significant effects on two delistings, acquisition/merger- or 
liquidation/bankruptcy-originated, in the same direction, including technology dummy, 
IPO activity, firm age, asset growth, R&D expenses, and leverage. Third, three covariates, 
including venture capital dummy, profitability, and firm size, have opposite effect on 
different events triggering the delisting, mergers and bad performance. The increase of 
these covariates could increase the risk of acquisition/merge delisting whereas reduce the 
risk of failure delisting. 
20 
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Table 1. Variable definitions   
Variable name  Definition 
Survival time Number of months traded on the exchanges after IPO 
Failure One if the firm delisted due to failure after IPO, zero otherwise 
Acquisition/Merge One if the firm delisted due to acquisition/merge after IPO, zero otherwise 
Venture dummy One if venture firm backed, zero otherwise 
Technology dummy One if high-technology firm, zero otherwise 
Underpricing (%) Initial return for the first trading day 
Proceeds ($ millions) Natural log of one plus Proceeds from the IPO in millions dollars 
IPO activity Number of IPOs per quarter 
Age (years) Natural log of one plus Firm age   
Equity ($ millions) Natural log of one plus market value of common shares outstanding 
E/A (%) Average percentage profitability 
dA/A (%)  Percent Growth in Assets 
R&D expense ($ millions) Natural log of one plus R&D expense 
SGA expenses ($ millions) Natural log of one plus selling, general, and administrative expenses 
Leverage (%) Total liabilities divided by total assets 
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Table 2: Status of IPO firms through 1975 to 2006     
IPO year Total Surviving Merges Move to Exchanges Liquidation & Bankruptcy 
1975 3 0 3 0 0 
1976 11 1 8 0 2 
1977 6 0 5 0 1 
1978 10 1 6 1 2 
1979 20 2 12 0 6 
1980 40 7 15 2 16 
1981 108 12 57 4 35 
1982 42 7 17 4 14 
1983 255 27 121 13 94 
1984 108 17 43 5 43 
1985 108 8 62 5 33 
1986 201 37 106 3 55 
1987 148 21 82 0 45 
1988 57 10 27 0 20 
1989 68 16 37 0 15 
1990 61 18 30 0 13 
1991 144 36 72 0 36 
1992 237 54 121 0 62 
1993 304 82 146 0 76 
1994 258 61 135 0 62 
1995 271 57 155 0 59 
1996 427 98 218 0 111 
1997 307 84 139 1 83 
1998 178 55 70 1 52 
1999 342 123 137 1 81 
2000 273 112 114 2 45 
2001 54 28 18 0 8 
2002 46 28 16 0 2 
2003 47 34 10 0 3 
2004 134 107 25 0 2 
2005 141 129 11 0 1 
2006 137 135 2 0 0 
Total 4546 1407 2020 42 1077 
 
2
3
 
 
T
a
b
le
 3
. 
D
e
s
c
ri
p
tiv
e
 s
ta
ti
s
tic
s
 f
o
r 
S
u
b
s
a
m
p
le
s
. 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
V
a
ri
a
b
le
 n
a
m
e
  
F
u
ll 
S
a
m
p
le
 
  
IP
O
s
 S
til
l T
ra
d
in
g
 
  
IP
O
s
 M
e
rg
e
s
 
  
IP
O
s
 E
xc
h
a
n
g
e
s
 
  
IP
O
s
 F
a
ile
d
 
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
fir
m
s 
N
=
4
,5
4
7
 
  
N
=
1
,4
0
4
 
  
N
=
2
,0
2
2
 
  
N
=
4
3
 
  
N
=
1
,0
7
8
 
M
e
a
n
 
S
td
. 
D
e
v
. 
  
M
e
a
n
 
S
td
. 
D
e
v
. 
  
M
e
a
n
 
S
td
. 
D
e
v
. 
  
M
e
a
n
 
S
td
. 
D
e
v
. 
  
M
e
a
n
 
S
td
. 
D
e
v
. 
S
u
rv
iv
a
l t
im
e
 (
M
o
n
th
s
) 
6
6
.1
1
1
 
5
8
.6
4
9
 
 
8
2
.6
6
0
 
6
5
.4
9
7
 
 
5
6
.6
0
6
 
5
2
.4
6
6
 
 
3
9
.1
8
3
 
3
8
.3
9
3
 
 
4
9
.8
5
6
 
4
4
.2
5
6
 
T
e
c
h
n
o
lo
g
y 
d
u
m
m
y 
0
.1
5
0
 
0
.3
5
7
 
 
0
.1
8
9
 
0
.3
9
1
 
 
0
.1
3
9
 
0
.3
4
6
 
 
0
.1
4
5
 
0
.3
5
3
 
 
0
.0
9
0
 
0
.2
8
6
 
V
e
n
tu
re
 d
u
m
m
y 
0
.4
2
2
 
0
.4
9
4
 
 
0
.4
4
3
 
0
.4
9
7
 
 
0
.4
3
7
 
0
.4
9
6
 
 
0
.3
6
0
 
0
.4
8
1
 
 
0
.3
4
5
 
0
.4
7
5
 
U
n
d
e
rp
ri
c
in
g
 (
%
) 
5
.3
4
5
 
4
2
.9
7
7
 
 
5
.0
0
7
 
4
5
.0
1
3
 
 
2
.8
5
7
 
4
1
.4
0
5
 
 
-1
5
.9
3
5
 
4
4
.8
3
3
 
 
1
0
.9
3
4
 
4
1
.1
3
6
 
P
ro
c
e
e
d
s
 (
$
 m
ill
io
n
s
) 
1
4
.8
0
7
 
1
3
.6
9
1
 
 
1
6
.6
3
5
 
1
4
.3
8
3
 
 
1
4
.4
2
7
 
1
3
.2
6
3
 
 
1
1
.6
3
4
 
1
2
.2
5
6
 
 
1
1
.5
0
9
 
1
2
.1
1
2
 
IP
O
 a
c
tiv
it
y 
6
0
.8
7
0
 
3
0
.5
8
5
 
 
6
2
.8
4
6
 
3
0
.5
5
0
 
 
5
8
.8
9
8
 
3
0
.5
9
3
 
 
5
1
.1
2
9
 
2
8
.9
7
6
 
 
6
0
.2
8
8
 
3
0
.2
1
6
 
A
g
e
 (
ye
a
rs
) 
2
.7
7
1
 
0
.7
6
1
 
 
2
.8
8
8
 
0
.7
2
5
 
 
2
.7
4
4
 
0
.7
5
6
 
 
2
.6
3
3
 
0
.7
6
8
 
 
2
.6
0
3
 
0
.7
9
0
 
E
/A
 (
%
) 
2
.1
1
9
 
1
7
.7
5
2
 
 
3
.0
1
3
 
1
7
.0
1
1
 
 
4
.3
3
1
 
1
5
.2
8
3
 
 
8
.3
7
6
 
1
1
.7
5
2
 
 
-4
.4
3
0
 
2
2
.0
0
5
 
d
A
/A
 (
%
) 
 
4
1
.1
4
0
 
7
1
.6
6
6
 
 
3
5
.2
3
3
 
6
3
.0
8
5
 
 
4
7
.0
1
4
 
7
3
.8
4
4
 
 
6
2
.3
8
2
 
7
9
.6
1
7
 
 
3
8
.6
3
1
 
7
9
.9
8
6
 
E
q
u
it
y 
($
 m
ill
io
n
s
) 
4
.0
1
7
 
1
.5
8
7
 
 
4
.4
6
1
 
1
.4
8
7
 
 
4
.0
1
3
 
1
.4
9
0
 
 
4
.2
8
5
 
1
.4
7
9
 
 
3
.0
4
5
 
1
.5
6
2
 
R
&
D
 e
xp
e
n
s
e
 (
$
 m
ill
io
n
s
) 
1
.9
1
5
 
1
.3
1
0
 
 
1
.9
6
9
 
1
.2
6
5
 
 
1
.9
2
9
 
1
.2
8
9
 
 
1
.8
3
7
 
1
.3
2
4
 
 
1
.7
8
2
 
1
.4
2
9
 
S
G
A
 e
xp
e
n
s
e
s
 (
$
 m
ill
io
n
s
) 
2
.8
5
2
 
1
.3
1
1
 
 
3
.0
8
2
 
1
.2
7
7
 
 
2
.8
1
3
 
1
.2
5
0
 
 
2
.7
9
3
 
1
.3
5
5
 
 
2
.4
6
7
 
1
.3
8
8
 
L
e
v
e
ra
g
e
 (
%
) 
4
4
.5
5
8
 
2
4
.3
5
9
 
  
4
0
.8
7
3
 
2
2
.8
9
1
 
  
4
3
.8
3
5
 
2
3
.9
3
1
 
  
4
9
.0
3
8
 
2
1
.7
8
7
 
  
5
4
.1
2
8
 
2
5
.6
9
3
 
 
24 
 
Table 4 Competing-risk Model Estimated Based on Information Including post-IPO Data 
   
Variable name Mergers (200-290)   Exchanges (300-390)   Bad Performance (400-599) 
Technology dummy -0.1884431 ** 
 
-0.9930925 
  
-0.5280817 *** 
 
(-2.07) 
  
(-1.35) 
  
(-3.12) 
 
Venture dummy 0.2698849 ***   0.1168986     -0.3221521 *** 
  (4.30)     (0.29)     (-3.50)   
Underpricing 0.0019387 ** 
 
0.0026763 
  
-0.0001024 
 
 
(2.51) 
  
(0.93) 
  
(-0.09) 
 
Proceeds 0.01886 
  
0.1309524 
  
-0.3959103 *** 
 
(0.43) 
  
(0.43) 
  
(-5.61) 
 
IPO activity 0.0035424 *** 
 
-0.0015641 
  
0.0049707 *** 
 
(2.91) 
  
(-0.23) 
  
(2.87) 
 
Age -0.0852551 ** 
 
0.1560133 
  
-0.3153695 *** 
 
(-2.04) 
  
(0.60) 
  
(-5.03) 
 
E/A 0.0117489 *** 0.0122675     -0.0214169 *** 
  (6.18)     (0.91)     (-10.33)   
dA/A 0.0029443 *** 
 
0.0011324 
  
0.0021552 *** 
 
(6.70) 
  
(0.47) 
  
(3.57) 
 
Equity 0.0792698 ***   0.2271507 **   -0.2696871 *** 
  (3.04)     (2.15)     (-6.66)   
R&D expense 0.0432972 * 
 
-0.1730271 
  
0.0821518 *** 
 
(1.76) 
  
(-1.16) 
  
(2.65) 
 
SGA expenses 0.0081118 
  
-0.0976521 
  
0.0950308 *** 
 
(0.28) 
  
(-0.74) 
  
(3.07) 
 
Leverage 0.0087782 *** 
 
0.0230566 *** 
 
0.0392581 *** 
 
(7.46) 
  
(3.27) 
  
(19.96) 
 
IPO Year (80-84) 0.0350091 
  
2.548512 *** 
 
1.255527 
 
 
(0.10) 
  
(5.53) 
  
(1.29) 
 
IPO Year (85-89) 0.2758279 
     
1.198326 
 
 
(0.77) 
     
(1.23) 
 
IPO Year (90-94) 0.4564393 
     
1.111746 
 
 
(1.28) 
     
(1.14) 
 
IPO Year (95-99) 0.7222998 ** 
 
-1.085598 
  
1.783539 * 
 
(2.00) 
  
(-1.26) 
  
(1.82) 
 
IPO Year (00-06) 0.6083188 * 
    
1.869134 * 
  (1.68) 
 
  
 
    (1.90)   
*, **, ***, significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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Figure-1 Cumulative Incidence Function (CIF) for Small, Medium, and Large firms 
 
 
 
 
